India Opens Drone Lab to Detect Chinese Parts as U.S., U.K. Track Chinese Fiber Shipment to Russia

The Indian facility, called Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats, or AASHVAST, checks whether a drone’s components actually match its documentation and flags cases where parts appear to have been swapped in. Investigators will pay particular attention to circuitry and chips that may have come from Chinese suppliers rather than approved manufacturers listed in procurement records.

Indian officials say even minor deviations in hardware markings or circuit layouts can trigger closer scrutiny of a drone’s supply chain. Technicians search each onboard controller and camera unit for concealed passwords, secret command pathways and embedded encryption keys that could grant unauthorized access. They also check for altered flight-control limits and tools that might allow someone to seize remote command of the aircraft.

The team further confirms whether each drone will install only updates issued by its original manufacturer, closing off a common route for tampering. It measures how well a drone’s navigation holds up when exposed to jamming or spoofing signals meant to mislead it. The entire process takes place without an internet connection, and no data from the tested drone can be copied to external systems. Examination also proceeds without altering the drone’s own software, so nothing is written back onto the hardware at any stage. TechRadar reported that the offline design suggests an intent to prevent classified information from leaving army custody or falling into the wrong hands.

Once vulnerabilities are found, they are ranked by severity and gathered into a single written report. That document lets the technician who tested the drone and the officer who approves it read identical information before signing off.

AASHVAST runs on a software suite built by QuickPay Tech, a Noida-based UAV technology firm. The suite is designed to flag altered code, unexpected components and configuration changes that would otherwise go unnoticed during routine checks. The laboratory sits inside the army’s technical directorate, a body responsible for the technical evaluation and repair of a wide range of army vehicles and electronic systems. General Dhiraj Seth, the army chief, formally inaugurated the site at Delhi Cantonment. Army officials say the initiative should improve the cyber defenses of sensitive platforms while supporting electronics manufactured within the country’s defense sector. Analysts say, however, that verifying hardware origin is only one part of ensuring a drone’s overall airworthiness for operational deployment, and whether such scrutiny will meaningfully reduce reliance on foreign-sourced components across India’s drone programs remains uncertain.

The separate shipping records described two large containers moving between Jilin Chemical Fiber Group and Alabuga-Volokno, a subsidiary of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. Investigators say the cargo was logged under a customs code normally reserved for civilian synthetic fiber, obscuring its actual military use. Alabuga-Volokno makes 39 separate carbon-fiber products for aviation, rocket engineering, drones, shipbuilding and armor. The company barely releases any civilian products, as roughly 89% of its output is expected to serve Russian defense firms by 2030.

Weapons expert David Albright said using the correct shipping code would have flagged the shipment as a dual-use item with both civilian and defense applications. Albright estimated the volume shipped could supply enough material for as many as 1,300 long-range attack drones. The Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre says it has tracked at least eight tenders for similar shipments between the two firms since 2022. It claims that sanctions have left Beijing as nearly the sole supplier of composite materials for Russian weapons manufacturing. A Kiel Institute analysis found that China supplies more than 60% of the components sustaining Russia’s military production. Former deputy secretary of state Kurt Campbell said dozens of Chinese firms now maintain deep ties to Moscow’s defense sector in exchange for military technology transfers.

The disclosure arrives weeks before Donald Trump is scheduled to meet Xi Jinping in Washington, a summit both governments would likely prefer to focus on trade rather than sanctions enforcement.

China’s embassy in Washington rejected the allegations, saying the country strictly controls dual-use goods and has never armed either side of the conflict. Rosatom likewise disputed any wrongdoing tied to its subsidiary’s customs filings. “Rosatom and its enterprises operate in full compliance with applicable laws and regulatory requirements,” said a spokesperson for the Russian state firm. “Any claim to the contrary is false and demonstrates a lack of understanding of how Russia’s customs authorities operate.”

Former U.S. officials remain skeptical of Beijing’s denials, arguing that state-owned firms operate under close government oversight. “They are doing it knowing that the Chinese government will not bust them for it,” said Dennis Wilder, former CIA deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific. “The idea that Chinese state-owned enterprises can hide things from the Chinese government just doesn’t wash.” Chinese leader Xi Jinping has maintained that China will not participate in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. “We would not add fuel to the fire, and above all we would not profiteer,” Xi said in 2023.

Despite the denials from Beijing and Moscow, Ukraine argues that Chinese support keeps Russia’s defense industry expanding production of drones and missile components. Kyiv warned that continued shipments only strengthen ties between two of the West’s strategic rivals, deepening cooperation across their industrial sectors. Ukraine called for secondary sanctions, tighter export controls, financial pressure on intermediaries and closer coordination with Asian partners to counter these networks.